Therapeutical-morphological Critique
of the Forms of Life
How is a morphological critique of the forms of life following from Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy possible? – Consequences of the interpretations of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy for the philosophy of mind.
This project has three main goals: 1. To reform critical philosophy on the basis of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. 2. To reconstruct the history of misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 3. To reappraise the problems of philosophy of mind in favour of critical philosophy.
The project is a continuation of the therapy-project of the chair of philosophy (History of philosophical therapy from Spinoza to Cavell). So far, studies about therapeutic philosophy in general, Spinoza, Psychoanalysis and Cavell have been pursued during this project. Now, an application of the distinction between doctrinaire and non-doctrinaire philosophizing recently introduced by Michael Hampe is to be aspired in reference to the role of innovative/dissident speaking as therapeutic means of a morphological critique of forms of life following Wittgenstein.
First, Russell's critique of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is to be investigated. According to Russell, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations seam to deal only with trivialities, canonise ordinary language, try to immunise reason against scientific critique, and are therefore in sum unscientific. In disputing the Russellian interpretation, the troubles of an adequate understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophising will be resolved and the doctrinaire philosophical appreciation lying behind Russell's Interpretation will be depicted as a form of philosophy Wittgenstein criticises over and over again. Moreover, Russell's conception of an appropriate philosophy of mind is to be challenged as a target of Wittgenstein's philosophical critique. Russell's notion of philosophy of mind is cultivated up to the present day, also partially combined with neuroscientific claims. This kind of philosophy of mind goes back to early modern concepts. Despite an explicit aversion against Cartesian substance dualism, contemporary philosophy of mind mostly is not capable to get rid of explanatory subsequent costs of this tradition.
In a subsequent step, a history of reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind will be reconstructed by reference to paradigmatic authors whose heterogeneous interpretations and continuations of his philosophy will be examined in the light of Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance. Starting with allegedly behaviouristic positions of Ryle and Sellars, the investigation covers Brandom's inerentialism, P.M.S. Hacker, who is often regarded as conservative-analytic, interpretations of the “New Wittgenstein” by Cora Diamond, Cavell's autobiographical approach, Eugen Fischer's cognitive-therapeutic Wittgenstein and the justificational synthetic materialism (put forward) by Arno Ros. Furthermore follows a morphology of the concepts for mental phenomena: that is the comprehension of the genesis and usage of faculties of discrimination in the region of the mental in the “flow of life” and their narrative “explanation” in Wittgenstein's “micro stories”. The creative appliance of the rules of language games to new cases is part of the capacity to speak in accordance with the rules of ordinary language. It is a competence, which can be made useful for a philosophical critique of the forms of life,starting from subjects, which are able to critically dissociate themselves from their own and strange/alien forms of life using concepts for mental phenomena. This applies to the therapeutic-critical behaviour of single persons as well as to critical philosophy in general. Therapeutic and critical reflection in such sense does not have to be language-game- or lifeform-relativistic (in a Rortyan way); nor must it,as an act of resignation, restrict itself only to the description of given linguistic practices. Critical faculty is neither reliant upon language-external standpoints looking “from nowhere” on forms of life nor an ideal language game common to all reasonable human beings (as Habermas seems to maintain). To meet these demands is the main objective of the introduced project.
Participants:
Martin Münnich
Prof. Dr. Michael Hampe